The impact of carbon disclosure mandates on emissions and financial operating performance by Downar, Benedikt et al.
The impact of carbon disclosure mandates
on emissions and financial operating performance
Benedikt Downar1 & Jürgen Ernstberger1 & Stefan Reichelstein2,3 &
Sebastian Schwenen1 & Aleksandar Zaklan4
Accepted: 1 June 2021/
# The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
We examine the impact of a disclosure mandate for greenhouse gas emissions on firms’
subsequent emission levels and financial operating performance. For UK-incorporated
listed firms a carbon disclosure mandate was adopted in 2013. Our difference-in-
differences design shows that firms affected by the mandate reduced their emissions
by about 8% relative to a control group of European firms. At the same time, our tests
indicate that the treated firms experienced no significant changes in their gross margins.
Taken together, our findings indicate that the reporting mandate had a real effect on the
variable to be disclosed without adversely affecting the financial operating performance
of the treated firms.
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1 Introduction
Climate change is widely regarded as one of the most vexing societal challenges of our
time. The root cause of this challenge is the fundamental externality that arises when
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economic subjects do not internalize the full social cost of their greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. The continuing mismatch between the private and social costs of GHG
emissions has arguably resulted in a large-scale global market failure.1 Policymakers
have begun to counteract this mismatch through a range of policy tools, such as carbon
pricing and direct emissions regulations.2 At the same time, relatively little is known
about the potential impact of a disclosure mandate that merely requires firms to report
their carbon footprint without any obligation to reduce these emissions over time.3
A central axiom in management accounting, dating back to Drucker (1954), postu-
lates that “what gets measured, also gets managed.” Inside firms, this linkage is
plausible and well-documented to the extent that the variable of interest is included
in the firm’s performance evaluation and incentive system.4 The linkage between
measurement and subsequent improvements becomes more tenuous in a market setting
where firms disclose the variable of interest to the general public. It appears plausible
that a mere requirement to report carbon emissions will “incentivize” firms to improve
upon their subsequent emissions (even though such improvements are costly), provided
that firms also anticipate being “rewarded” by different stakeholder groups for these
improvements.
Numerous studies on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Environmental,
Social and Governance (ESG) activities have observed that improvements in outcome
variables are often difficult to establish because there is no commonly accepted
measurement framework, e.g., labor practices that are deemed sustainable.5 The lack
of a well-defined measurement framework also makes it difficult, if not practically
impossible, to have subsequent outcomes verified by third parties.6 In these respects,
greenhouse gas emissions are a relative exception, as they involve physical measure-
ments, the delineation of scope (e.g., so-called Scope 1 or Scope 2 emissions), and an
aggregate score for multiple greenhouse gases in order to arrive at a measure of CO2
equivalents.
The main hypothesis examined in this paper is whether mandatory reporting entails
a real GHG emission reduction effect, possibly because of stakeholder pressure on
firms to subsequently “manage”—in the sense of Drucker (1954)—their carbon emis-
sions. It seems plausible that firms will do so because multiple stakeholder groups,
including customers, employees, and investors, regard corporate emissions as a nega-
tive firm attribute. In that sense, a disclosure mandate may create a “pillory” with
regard to a firm’s carbon footprint.7 As firms can point to improvements with regard to
1 The so-called Stern Review (Stern 2006) famously refers to climate change as “the greatest market failure
ever seen.”
2 See Ellerman et al. (2010), Anderson and Di Maria (2011), Bel and Joseph (2015), Murray and Maniloff
(2015), and Martin et al. (2016).
3 As discussed in more detail below, contemporaneous papers by Tomar (2019), Jouvenot and Krueger
(2020), and Grewal (2021) also examine the real effects of carbon disclosure mandates.
4 See, for instance, Young and O’Byrne (2001) and Kaplan and Anderson (2007).
5 See, for instance, Christensen et al. (2017), Fiechter et al. (2020), Grewal et al. (2019), and Grewal and
Serafeim (2020) for a comprehensive assessment of the many recent studies on corporate sustainability
management.
6 Kanodia (2007) develops a model framework in which the designer faces a trade-off in setting a precision
standard for disclosures due to the real (investment) effects that emerge in the ensuing market equilibrium.
7 A particular firm-level outcome variable, like pollution, that is publicly known and viewed as a negative by
investors is also the central feature in the models of Heinkel et al. (2001) and Friedman and Heinle (2016).
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this publicly reported “bad” in the future, they will arguably improve their standing
with different stakeholder groups.8
Our study evolves around the Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’
Report) Regulations 2013. This act imposed a mandate on publicly listed UK-
incorporated firms to report their GHG emissions as part of their annual financial
reports. Prior to this mandate, companies had an obligation to gather and report the
emissions of their individual installations (i.e., production sites such as power plants or
steel mills) that were regulated under the European Union Emissions Trading System
(EU ETS) to a publicly available register.9 Prior to 2013, there was no obligation for
publicly listed UK firms to report their overall “carbon footprint” as the aggregate of
their installation-level emissions in the annual corporate report. In that sense, the
regulation increased transparency, as interested parties no longer had to trace emission
figures at the installation level back to the parent companies owning the installation.
To examine the impact of the UK GHG emission disclosure mandate on subsequent
emissions and financial performance, we adopt a difference-in-differences (DiD) ap-
proach surrounding the implementation of the Companies Act. We compare the
difference between pre- and post-mandate emission data for affected firms with
emission data for a sample of control firms. In our study, this comparison is made
feasible by tracing the emissions of all installations, as reported to the central EU ETS
registry, back to the firms in our sample for a ten-year time window around the year
2013. The treatment group in our DiD design consists of installations that are located in
the UK or another European country but are ultimately owned by UK-incorporated,
publicly listed companies.10 The control group consists of installations that are ulti-
mately owned by companies not subject to the 2013 act—that is, publicly listed firms in
other EU countries.
Our results provide evidence of a significant reduction in GHG emissions following
the disclosure mandate for firms in the treatment group relative to the control group.
The effect is sizable insofar as firms subject to the mandate, on average, reduce their
GHG emissions by about 8% between the pre- and the post-mandate periods.
The 2013 UK mandate also requires firms to disclose a carbon intensity
variable that expresses total CO2-equivalent emissions in relation to some activity
measure such as output, cost, or revenues. Such a ratio measure will be more
informative about actual emission improvements for firms that have experienced
substantial growth or contraction over time. We estimate the effect of the disclo-
sure mandate on firms’ carbon intensity by considering both sales and cost of
goods sold (COGS) as the activity variable in the denominator. We find that the
firms in the treatment group exhibit a significant incremental reduction in carbon
intensity of approximately 13% (10%) when the denominator in the carbon
8 Prior studies document real effects of disclosure regulation on investment (Biddle and Hilary 2006; Biddle
et al. 2009; Graham et al. 2011; Cheng et al. 2013; Shroff et al. 2014; Shroff 2017), mine safety Christensen
et al. (2017), and managerial short-termism (Ernstberger et al. 2017; Granja 2018; Kraft et al. 2018).
9 The EU Transaction Log records yearly emissions from all installations regulated under the EU Emissions
Trading System.
10 Our study focuses on data of all installations covered by the EU ETS, i.e., emissions within the 27 member
states of the European Union and Norway. Since data on installations in other countries is not available, we
cannot rule out carbon leakage between firms’ European and non-European installations. However,
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2019) find no evidence of carbon substitution effects across countries.
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intensity ratio is COGS (sales). Finally, we provide evidence that our results are
robust to alternative empirical design choices, to reliance on a balanced rather than
unbalanced sample, and to a matched-sample approach.
The magnitude of the reduction in emissions and carbon intensity may appear
surprising for two reasons. First, as mentioned above, the information about Scope
1 emissions at the level of individual installations was already available prior to
the 2013 mandate, albeit in dispersed form. As such, the mandate arguably only
“pilloried” the treated firms to the extent that firm-level emissions became more
accessible and transparent. Second, more than two-thirds of the treated firms in
our sample participated in the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), which provides a
global forum for firms and/or their subsidiaries to supply voluntary information
about their GHG emissions and ongoing efforts to reduce them.11 There are no
binding reporting standards or informational requirements for disclosures
submitted to the CDP. A reflection of this lack of formal requirements is that
the CDP rates the participating firms with a score regarding the credibility and
comprehensiveness of their voluntary disclosures. One way to interpret the UK
GHG reporting mandate is that the obligation to report total corporate Scope 1 and
2 GHG emissions forced the unravelling of a partial disclosure equilibrium that
was in effect prior to 2013.
With regard to the financial impact of the 2013 disclosure mandate, it would be
surprising to find that the regulation had improved the financial operating performance
of the treated firms. If firms had anticipated such beneficial effects, they could have pre-
committed to provide information on emission reductions in their annual reports. Thus,
one would expect that abnormal efforts to reduce GHG emissions are costly. Firms can
reduce emissions in the short and medium run through a range of measures, including
input substitutions and the outsourcing of carbon intensive activities. The well-known
study by McKinsey (2009) suggests that some industries may have access to low-cost
abatement options, such as installation retrofits.12 Yet, there does not seem to be a
general understanding of the abatement potential (in terms of tons of CO2 saved) of
these low cost options.
Any cost increases associated with abnormal carbon reduction efforts could be
partially offset by higher sales. Such revenue increases could simply reflect pricing
power that allows firms to pass on the increase in their production costs. At the same
time, and in line with our notion of “stakeholder pressure,” any differential increase in
sales could also reflect that firms reporting significant carbon emission reductions in
their annual reports attain greater loyalty from their customers.
Testing the hypothesis of a net-zero effect on revenues and cost, our DiD analysis
shows that the treated firms do not experience a significant incremental impact in terms
of their gross margins following the 2013 regulation. In separate explorations of the
overall effect of the mandate on financial operating performance, our regression results
indicate that the treated firms exhibit a small, but statistically insignificant, increase in
both production costs and sales relative to the firms in the control group. The same
conclusion emerges for capital expenditures that may have been undertaken to achieve
11 Broadstock et al. (2018) point to the endogeneity issues that have afflicted empirical studies on voluntary
corporate disclosures of GHG emissions.
12 The 2018 IPCC report discusses the abatement potential of different options.
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the emission reductions. Taken together, our findings indicate that the disclosure
requirement for publicly listed UK firms does not lead to a deterioration in their
financial operating performance.
The final part of our analysis explores cross-sectional variation among the treated
firms in their response to the disclosure requirement. In this part, we exploit the
information available at the individual installation rather than the aggregate firm level.
Specifically, we construct a complexity index that ranks firm heterogeneity in terms of
the number of installations firms operate, the percentage of emissions these firms incur
abroad, and the number of sectors in which firms are active. Our findings indicate that
firms with a higher complexity score tend to reduce emissions at a lesser rate than their
less complex counterparts.
Several other contemporaneous studies have examined the effects of mandatory
reporting on corporate GHG emissions. Closest to our study are papers by
Jouvenot and Krueger (2020), Grewal (2021), and Tomar (2019), the first two
of which also focus on the UK disclosure mandate for GHG emissions in 2013. To
quantify the impact of the mandate on subsequent emission levels, Jouvenot and
Krueger (2020) rely on voluntarily disclosed information in the CDP database and
on emission estimates issued by private organizations that track corporate GHG
emissions. In contrast, our analysis relies on the granular, time-consistent, and
verified data provided to the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL) register at
the level of individual production sites, both prior to and after the mandate.
Beyond the impact of the mandate on actual emissions, our study examines the
impact on financial operating performance, while Jouvenot and Krueger (2020)
study the consequences of the mandate on investments by large institutional
investors, on media coverage, and on stock prices.
In a study complementary to ours, Grewal (2021) focuses on firms that were already
reporting information about their carbon emissions to the Carbon Disclosure Project
(CDP). Grewal (2021) establishes that, following the 2013 regulation, the subset of
treated UK firms reports larger emission reductions than their counterparts not subject
to the regulation. Furthermore, the incremental effect is more pronounced for firms with
a relatively high level of pre-mandate emissions. These findings are consistent with our
interpretation that the reporting mandate has an additional “pillory effect” beyond the
information that firms already disclosed through channels like the CDP. In contrast to
our approach, though, Grewal’s (2021) analysis considers self-reported emission levels
both before and after the mandate, rather than the emission figures verified under the
European ETS system.
Tomar (2019) studies the effect of a regulation that obligates large US production
facilities to report their emissions to the US Environmental Protection Agency. In
contrast to the UK regulation, however, there was, and still is, no requirement that US
firms disclose their emissions in the aggregate as part of the annual report. Thus, the
post-mandate disclosure requirement in Tomar’s study is similar to the pre-mandate
setting that UK firms faced on account of the EU ETS regulations prior to the 2013 act.
Regarding pre-treatment emission levels, Tomar (2019) develops an estimation tech-
nique for both the treatment and the control group. At the same time, Tomar’s main
conclusions, like those of the other two studies discussed above, are broadly consistent
with our first result that a disclosure mandate resulted in a significant reduction in
subsequent GHG emissions.
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Beyond the issue of GHG emissions, our study adds to the broader literature on the
real effects of disclosure mandates regarding environmental and hazardous outcomes.
Christensen et al. (2017) provide evidence that the Dodd-Frank Act provision requiring
firms engaged in natural resource extraction to report on mine accidents and citations
on mines in their annual reports did lead to improved worker safety in the mines of the
regulated firms.13 In another recent study, Chen et al. (2018) show that mandatory CSR
reporting decreases local pollution levels, i.e., wastewater and sulfur dioxide (SO2)
emissions, in Chinese cities in which firms affected by the CSR mandate are located.
Chen et al. also argue that the CSR mandate was associated with a decrease in firms’
accounting rates of return.
Similar to the setting in Christensen et al. (2017) and Chen et al. (2018), our central
hypothesis is that the disclosure mandate increases transparency and thereby creates
pressure on management to improve the outcome variable in question. In case of mine
safety or local environmental pollution, the hypothesized “pillory effect” is highly
plausible because the reported information will be of interest to local media outlets and
analysts. In contrast, with global pollution, the intensity of stakeholder pressure is less
clear because the costs associated with GHG pollution, and therefore the benefits of
reducing them, are distributed globally and thus affect local stakeholders only
proportionally.14
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the regulatory
background and develops the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes the research
design. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 presents sensitivity and additional
analyses. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Regulatory background and hypothesis development
2.1 Regulatory background
The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013
were presented to the UK Parliament by the Department for Business, Innovation and
Skills (BIS) in June 11, 2013. The act was published in August 2013 and came into
effect on October 1, 2013. Accordingly, “listed companies” are required to disclose
their direct and indirect GHG emissions in their annual reports. Section 385 (2) of the
act defines a listed company as a UK-incorporated company whose equity shares are
listed on the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange, an exchange in a European
Economic Area state, the New York Stock Exchange, or Nasdaq. The act applies to all
fiscal years ending on or after September 30, 2013.
In particular, the 2013 act requires that companies disclose, in the Directors’ Report,
their direct (Scope 1) and indirect (Scope 2) GHG emissions during the last 12 months.
13 As in our study, the information to be reported annually was already public prior to the regulation, since
firms had to report it to the Mine Safety and Health Administration. In that sense, the disclosure mandate
merely highlighted an individual firm’s performance with regard to the outcome variable.
14 Prior literature has established that SO2 is a local hazard affecting human health outcomes and agricultural
yields (Muller et al. 2011; EPA 2019), while CO2 constitutes a non-toxic, yet global long-term threat to the
stability of the world’s climate. In that sense, the effects of SO2 are significantly different from those of GHG
emissions like CO2.
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Direct emissions are those caused by the combustion of fuels and the operation of
production facilities. Indirect emissions are those resulting from the purchase of
electricity, heat, steam, or cooling. The following greenhouse gases are to be included
in the report: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O),
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6).
Companies are not required to provide individual emission figures for each of the
greenhouse gases listed. Instead, they are asked to report the aggregate annual quantity
of GHG emissions in tCO2eq, with the weights determined according to the weights set
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.15 In addition to the total Scope 1
and Scope 2 tCO2eq, companies must report a carbon intensity metric that relates
emissions to some activity measure such as sales or cost of goods sold.
In addition to GHG emissions, the act imposes disclosure requirements pertaining to
the diversity of directors, senior managers, and other employees as well as broader
social and human rights issues. UK companies also face new obligations to report on
environmental matters and developments that are likely to affect their business in the
future. In Appendix A, we provide an overview of the new reporting items. While there
is no indication that any of these reporting requirements confound our results, we
cannot rule out that the broader environmental reporting mandate might also have
influenced the propensity of the UK firms to reduce their carbon emissions.
The GHG disclosure mandate does not prescribe a specific method for calculating
GHG emissions, but it requires the use of “robust and accepted methods” (DEFR 2013)
and recommends a “widely recognized independent standard” (DEFR 2013). It en-
courages companies to “use relevant information from other domestic and international
regulatory reporting processes” (DEFR 2013), such as data collected through the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the approach taken in this study.
The data collected under the auspices of the EU ETS is publicly available in the
European Union Transaction Log (EUTL) register, which provides information at the
installation level, including its identification, operator, NACE code, and the activity
type it is assigned to in the EU ETS (e.g., production of bulk chemicals or combustion
of fuels). We refer to the emissions reported to the EUTL as actual (Scope 1)
emissions. While the actual volume of GHG in the flue gases of a particular facility
is inherently difficult to track in real time, we view the detailed Monitoring, Reporting
and Verification (MRV) framework adopted by the European Union as a fairly precise
method for determining actual emissions. Specifically, the MRV regulations describe
(i) the allowable method for calculating the emissions by different facilities given their
activity levels (Monitoring), (ii) the firms’ reporting requirements (Reporting), and (iii)
the external parties that national regulators can accredit as verifiers (Verification).
Finally, the reported and verified emissions are subject to confirmation by an indepen-
dent reviewer. These detailed regulations are intended to prevent underreporting of
emissions by firms, which would allow them to purchase fewer emission allowances.
This standardized measurement appears to have been unchanged in the years surround-
ing the UK disclosure mandate.
15 The UK Government publishes the conversion factors for GHG emissions to tCO2 equivalents on an annual
basis. These factors are generally consistent with IPCC guidelines and the regulations under the EU ETS. The
report must be approved by the board of directors and reviewed by the statutory auditor, while compliance
with the act is enforced by the UK Financial Reporting Council. Directors of the affected firms face fines for
being reckless or failing to take reasonable steps to ensure compliance (paragraph 415, (4) and (5) of the act).
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Since its introduction in 2005, the EU ETS has become the world’s largest multi-
national emissions trading system.16 This cap-and-trade mechanism covers industries
that account for about 45% of the European Union’s GHG emissions (Ellerman et al.
2016).17 The remaining emissions not covered under the ETS system come primarily
from the transportation, residential, and agricultural sectors (DECC 2016). Installations
are covered by the EU ETS if they include a facility with a rated thermal input of at
least 20 MW—enough to supply about 15,000 households with electricity at a given
point in time—or if they fall into one or several of the following manufacturing
segments: oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel, cement clinker, glass, lime, bricks,
ceramics, pulp, paper and board, aluminum, petrochemicals, ammonia, nitric, adipic
and glyoxylic acid production (European Commission 2015). Due to these rules, EU
ETS coverage is concentrated in the sectors of energy supply and industrial
manufacturing, covering approximately 79% of all UK emissions in 2014. Finally,
note that the implementation of the act took place in the same year as the transition of
the EU ETS to its third trading period, which covered the years 2013–2020.18 The
underlying scheme generating the emission data used in this paper hence spans two
trading periods, and the transition to the third period took place concurrently to the
introduction of the act. In Appendix B, we discuss these concurrent changes in more
detail. We believe none affects our treatment and control group differentially.
Annual emissions by installations vary widely, ranging from a few thousand tons per
year at small installations to several million tons at large coal power plants. The average
(mean) UK installation covered by the EU ETS had emissions of about 100,000 tons of
CO2 equivalents during our sample period.
From an inference perspective, there are several benefits to our approach of tracking
direct (Scope 1) GHG emissions from individual installations according to the EU ETS
data. Most importantly, the reported figures were measured and audited consistently
both before and after the UK disclosure mandate went into effect. Unlike other studies,
such as Tomar (2019), we therefore do not have to estimate a firm’s emissions prior to
the reporting mandate. In the context of our disclosure study, there is an additional
advantage to focusing on Scope 1 emissions as the outcome variable. As explained in
more detail in Section 3.5, UK power producers were subject to sector-specific
emission charges and therefore had additional financial incentives to reduce their Scope
1 emissions during our observation window. Any such improvements will therefore
carry through as improvements in the Scope 2 emissions of UK based installations that
purchase electricity from the grid. If emissions are measured as the total of Scope 1 and
Scope 2 emissions, a reduction in a firm’s carbon emissions after the mandate could
therefore be merely the result of lower Scope 1 emissions by the upstream electricity
producers.
16 Emission trading systems similar to the EU ETS have also been introduced in a few other jurisdictions. In
the US, the California cap-and-trade scheme covers GHG emissions from power generation and industrial
activities of facilities based in California (Air Resources Board 2016), and the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative covers emissions from electricity production in nine Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states (RGGI
2013).
17 For our sample country, the UK, the EU ETS covers a similar share of total emissions. For instance, in
2014, the first full year after the introduction of the disclosure rule, the EU ETS covered about 41% of total
UK emissions. In 2014, total UK emissions were 514 million tons of CO2eq, while the sum of verified
emissions of all UK installations in the UK was 208 million tons of CO2eq (DECC 2016).
18 The first trading period covered the years 2005–2007, while the second encompassed 2008–2012.
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To examine changes in emissions at the firm level, we assign all installations to their
respective owners and aggregate the emissions data at the installation level for each
firm. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the mapping from installations to firms (mathematically, a
function) is carried out for both the treated UK-headquartered firms and the control
group of firms that were not subject to the mandate.
We emphasize that in the context of our study the disclosure mandate did not make
additional information publicly available, as the emissions of the treated firms were
already accessible to the general public, albeit in a rather fragmented form, through the
EUTL register. In essence, the informational effect of the disclosure mandate was to
increase transparency, because an interested observer no longer had to carry out the
mapping shown in Fig. 1 to calculate a firm’s overall Scope 1 emissions.
2.2 Hypothesis development
The hypotheses tested in this paper pertain both to changes in GHG emissions and to
changes in the financial operating performance of the firms subject to the UK disclo-
sure mandate. Broadly, our approach is consistent with the so-called targeted disclosure
cycle theory (Fung et al. 2007). Accordingly, disclosures influence the behavior of
receivers (stakeholders), leading to real effects in the variables to be disclosed in the
future. The information providers anticipate these behavioral changes and take actions
that enable more favorable disclosures.
In a recent survey article, Hombach and Sellhorn (2019) lay out a set of criteria for
corporate reporting mandates to have real effects, that is, effects on the variables that
are being disclosed. Aside from sufficiently precise reporting standards and compliance
requirements, the reporting variables in question must generate additional public
information, or at least increase transparency about the variable in question. In order
for real effects to emerge from a reporting mandate, Hombach and Sellhorn (2019) also
posit that the disclosed information must be broadly value relevant, possibly by
illuminating potential future risks to the business. Finally, management must have both
the discretion and the motivation to subsequently improve the outcome variable.
Fig. 1 Mapping of installations to firms. This figure shows the mapping of data at the installation level (as
reported in the EU ETS) to treatment and control group firms. Using information on the (ultimate) owner of
each installation, we map installations to either a treatment or a control group firm. The link between the
installation owner and the ultimate owner (i.e., firm in our sample) is established by the Ownership Links and
Enhanced EUTL Dataset Project (OLP), which provides the name and Bureau-van-Dijk identification number
of an installation’s ultimate parent company
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The preceding criteria all appear to be met by the UK 2013 disclosure mandate. In
addition to a specific reporting standard and the prospect of enforcement, it is plausible
that multiple stakeholder groups of the treated firms, including customers, employees
and capital providers, view the firm’s carbon footprint as a negative. Because of the
externality associated with the firm’s emissions on the world’s climate, these constit-
uents would intrinsically prefer a lower carbon footprint, though they are likely to
understand that certain emissions levels are unavoidable in the short run if the firm is to
remain competitive in its product markets.
If the firms subject to the 2013 carbon disclosure mandate did indeed reduce their
emissions more than the control group, the natural follow-on question is whether these
efforts had a tangible impact on financial operating performance. On the benefit side,
firms may anticipate that potential production cost increases can at least be partially
passed on to consumers. While the possibility of pass-through generally depends on a
firm’s cost structure and pricing power, a tangible reduction in publicly reported carbon
emissions will arguably improve the firm’s public image. That, in turn, may lead to
greater customer loyalty and thus a lower price elasticity of demand for customers who
regard the firm’s carbon footprint as a negative attribute.19 From that perspective,
emission reductions in the interest of “stakeholder capitalism” would at least be
partially aligned with the interests of shareholders.
Another stakeholder group that may react favorably to improvements in reported
carbon emissions are the firm’s employees. For the same reasons as articulated in
connection with customers, some employees will be intrinsically concerned about the
climate-damaging effects of the firm’s emissions. This group will tend to identify more
strongly with an organization that can publicly and credibly claim to be innovative and
progressive on the issue of climate change. To the innovating firms, the potential
benefit from such an improvement in public perception is that ceteris paribus less
compensation may be required to retain valued employees.
Finally, management of the firms in our treatment group may anticipate penalties by
the capital markets unless improvements in carbon emissions can be claimed in the time
periods following a disclosure mandate. In recent years, institutional equity investors
have become increasingly vocal that meaningful sustainability practices are becoming a
major criterion for the inclusion of firms in their portfolios. A potential penalty for
firms that are viewed as stagnant in their emission levels (or other sustainability
activities) is that they may be “shunned” by some investor groups, leading to an
increase in their cost of equity capital.20 Kraus and Amir (2010) and Friedman and
Heinle (2016) develop formal models wherein investors, in equilibrium, effectively
exert pressure on management to improve a firm’s sustainability practices.21 The
preference structure of these institutional investors may directly reflect the intrinsic
preferences of their capital providers. Some institutional investors have also explicitly
stated that they view sustainability practices as an effective mitigation strategy with
19 Reichelstein and Hoyt (2011) argue that this linkage was important for management at the outdoor
equipment retailer REI in setting sustainability targets, including a substantial carbon footprint reduction.
20 A widely reported illustration of such “penalties” was provided by the CEO of BlackRock, Larry Fink, in
his annual letter to CEOs in 2020, when he stated, “We will be increasingly disposed to vote against
management and board directors when companies are not making sufficient progress on sustainability-
related disclosures and the business practices and plans underlying them” (Sprouse 2020).
21 Disclosure is not an issue in these models, as the CSR variable of interest is assumed to be publicly known.
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regard to future financial risks, specifically the risk of carbon intensive assets becoming
economically impaired.22
Arguments suggesting that the real effect of the UK mandate could be minor include
the possibility that the added transparency resulting from the disclosure requirement
was inconsequential insofar as concerned parties could already access the EU transac-
tion log prior to the mandate. Furthermore, with some additional information gathering
effort, interested parties could trace the emissions from individual installations back to
the parent companies owning the installations (Fig. 1).
We also note that a substantial share of the treatment firms in our sample did already
report information about their GHG emissions to the Carbon Disclosure Project prior to
2013. These disclosures, however, are neither subject to binding reporting standards
nor verified by a third party.23 Participation in the CDP has always been voluntary and
therefore reflects self-selection by the participating firms.24 Nonetheless, as emphasized
in Grewal’s (2021) study, these disclosures may already have conveyed material firm-
level information about emissions ahead of the act.25 Finally, while the treated firms
may indeed have perceived their annual emissions reports as a “pillory,” the actual
reduction potential available to them in the short and medium run, i.e., over a period of
five or six years in our post-mandate observation window, may have been limited. This
may be especially plausible because many of the treated firms were already subject to
carbon pricing under the EU ETS system and therefore already had an incentive to
adjust their production processes in the direction of more energy- and carbon-
efficiency.
Mindful of the preceding countervailing considerations, we nonetheless state the
following hypothesis.
H1: Firms subject to the UK mandate for annual disclosure of GHG emissions
attain a larger reduction in their Scope 1 emissions than firms not subject to the
mandate.
The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013
also require firms to disclose a carbon intensity variable that relates raw emissions of
CO2 equivalents to a meaningful indicator of production activity. Thus, the carbon
intensity variable should indicate whether a reduction in emissions can be attributed to
a mere reduction in production volume, or, conversely, whether an increase in
22 The belief that long-term value maximization requires management practices that are environmentally and
socially sustainable is emphasized, for instance, by investment funds like Generation Investment Capital
(Reichelstein and Bebb 2016).
23 A survey of UK equity fund managers shows that the lack of detailed requirements concerning reporting
methodologies and organizational boundaries, as well as the lack of a third-party audit or review, was an
important barrier for their reliance on voluntary GHG emission data (Trucost 2009).
24 Examining voluntary carbon disclosure in the UK retail sector, Sullivan and Gouldson (2012) indicate that
voluntary disclosure limits investors’ ability to assess corporate climate performance due to different scopes of
reporting and inconsistencies in the information being reported. In addition, DEFRA (2010) states that “even
though CDP data is widely regarded as the most complete and comprehensive dataset on climate disclosure,
many question quality of data as an issue which is inevitable with any voluntary disclosure scheme not
requiring third party verification.”
25 According to a survey of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) in partnership with the Carbon Disclosure Project
(CDP), voluntary reporting of GHG emissions by a company raised the awareness of emissions for the board
of directors, employees and the general public (PwC and CDP 2010).
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emissions can be attributed to production growth. For the denominator in the carbon
intensity measure, we consider both sales and cost of goods sold, noting that, for the
firms in our treatment group, both of these variables were arguably affected by the
disclosure mandate of 2013. In direct analogy to hypothesis H1, we hypothesize that
the UK disclosure mandate of 2013 also had a real effect on the carbon intensity of the
treated firms.
H2: Firms subject to the UK mandate for annual disclosure of GHG emissions
attain a larger reduction in their carbon intensity than firms not subject to the
mandate.
Our next hypothesis pertains to the financial performance of the treated firms. In order
to reduce their carbon footprint, firms will presumably incur higher production costs.
The magnitude and shape of the individual abatement cost curves, however, appear
difficult to gauge, and are likely to vary considerably by industry. Several emission
reduction measures will conceivably be available to firms in the manufacturing sector
in the short and medium run. For instance, onsite fossil fuel power plants can be idled,
with the requisite power and heat then procured from outside vendors. This would
induce a shift from Scope 1 to Scope 2 emissions, with firms likely to care primarily
about their “own” Scope 1 emissions.26
Additional reduction measures include possible input substitutions that reduce the
reliance on carbon-intensive materials like coal. For production processes requiring
high operating temperatures, for instance, firms in carbon-intensive industries like steel
and cement can switch from using coal or oil as a heating agent to electricity or less
carbon-intensive agents like natural gas or hydrogen. Finally, holding output and
production processes constant, many businesses will be in a position to reduce their
fossil-fuel consumption and, thus, their emissions through investments in equipment
that is more energy efficient.
The impact of alternative carbon reduction measures on overall manufacturing costs
has to date not been estimated reliably at the level of individual industries. The carbon
abatement curves by McKinsey (2009) suggest that, for moderate GHG reductions, firms
will be able to identify considerable “low hanging fruit” with a corresponding small cost
per ton of CO2 abated. Even if the cost per ton abated were to assume an extremely high
value of say 100 euro per ton, the median firm in our sample, with carbon emissions of
one million tons per year, would only experience a 10 million euro increase in
manufacturing costs if it were to reduce emissions by 10 %. Furthermore, the impact of
any such measures on a firm’s gross margin percentage (defined as sales minus cost of
goods sold divided by sales) would be offset by any corresponding sales revenue
increases. The usual possibilities of a cost pass-through may be enhanced for firms that
demonstrate improvements in their carbon footprint in the post-mandate period on
account of greater customer loyalty expressing itself in a lower price elasticity of demand.
The combination of cost increases that are likely to be minor in comparison to
overall production costs and the potential for improved customer loyalty due to
emission reductions leads us to the following hypothesis.
26 By procuring power from outside vendors, a firm will also lower its total Scope 1 plus Scope 2 emissions, if
the grid power it purchases is less carbon intensive.
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H3: Firms subject to the UK mandate for annual disclosure of GHG emissions
exhibit no change in their gross margins compared to firms not subject to the
mandate.
Since the firms in our treatment group represent a wide cross-section of UK firms, it is
natural to ask whether certain subgroups did achieve carbon emission reductions that
differed substantially from the group average. In this context, we differentiate among
firms according to the number of installations they own, the percentage of GHG
emissions they incur outside of the UK, and the number of sectors they are active in.
We use these three variables as the basis of a complexity score, and hypothesize that
less complex firms, on average, achieve larger GHG emission reductions following the
2013 mandate.
Our intuitive reasoning underlying the following hypothesis is that less complex
firms will, all else equal, find it easier to identify emission reductions that can be
achieved across the board. UK-headquartered firms with a larger conglomerate struc-
ture could arguably also find it more difficult to incentivize country managers to
implement local emission reductions. Finally, such firms may perceive a lesser benefit
in terms of their standing with different stakeholder groups due to an overall improve-
ment in GHG emissions as reported by the UK parent company.
H4: Firms subject to the UK mandate with a higher complexity score reduce their
GHG emissions by a smaller percentage than their UK counterparts with a lower
complexity score.
3 Research design and data
3.1 Empirical test: Hypothesis H1
We use the following firm-level staggered difference-in-differences approach to esti-
mate the effect of the GHG emission disclosure mandate on actual emissions following
the UK Companies Act:
E ¼ α0 þ α1  Post þ α2  Post  Treat þ ∑Control variables
þFixed effects for firmsþ Fixed effects for yearsþ Industry time trendsþ ε ð1Þ
All variables are defined in Table 1. Our dependent variable E indicates the natural
logarithm of CO2-equivalent GHG emissions at the aggregate level of the firm owning
the installation (as illustrated in Fig. 1). Emission data for one firm-year observation are
based on emission data on the portfolio of installations owned by the firm in a particular
year.27
27 We also estimate the model at the level of individual installations. For this test, we adjust all firm-level
variables accordingly. For example, instead of aggregate emissions at the firm level, we consider emissions of
the individual installation as the dependent variable. In a similar vein, we insert fixed effects at the installation
rather than firm level. Since we have no data on the characteristics of individual installations except for
emissions and operating activity, we keep the time-variant characteristics of the firm owning the installation as
control variables for this regression.
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Post is a binary variable indicating periods after the mandate for GHG emission
disclosure. Our study is based on observations from the years 2009–2018. The mandate
for GHG emission disclosure applies to all fiscal years ending on or after September 30,
2013. If a firm’s fiscal year ends before this date, we define the emissions reported for
the calendar year 2013 as a pre-treatment observation. If a firm’s financial year ends on
or after September 30, 2013, we define emissions reported for the calendar year 2013 as
a post-treatment observation. As a consequence, the mandate to disclose GHG emis-
sions applies to firms as of 2013 or 2014 (staggered implementation), depending on the
respective fiscal year-end date.
Treat is an indicator variable that assumes the value of one if a firm was subject to
the mandate and zero otherwise. As the control group, we use firms not subject to the
mandate for GHG emission disclosure. Specifically, the control group consists of listed
firms headquartered in other EU15 countries. Our primary variable of interest is α2 ·
Post · Treat. A significant negative coefficient on α2 indicates that, on average, the
treated firms achieved an incremental reduction in emissions following the disclosure
mandate.
In estimating Eq. (1), we include a set of time-variant control variables at the firm
level to account for differences in firm characteristics that might influence a firm’s
incentives and abilities to reduce emission levels. Specifically, we control for firm size,
because larger firms might have a higher willingness and ability to reduce emissions, as
they are more visible to the public and might have economies of scope or scale in
reducing emissions. We also include asset intensity. Firms with a larger asset base may
have to invest in new technologies to reduce carbon emissions, while firms with
relatively fewer assets could facilitate emission reductions in the short term through
operational changes. Another control variable is the price-to-book ratio, because future
growth opportunities may be related to a firm’s ability to reduce its carbon emissions.
We finally include leverage, to account for outside control by creditors and the
financing potential for reducing emissions.
To account for different country-level developments between firms listed in the UK
and EU countries, we control for countries’ GDP and changes in producer prices as
measured by the Producer Price Index. To control for time-specific and firm-specific
unobserved heterogeneity, we include firm and year fixed effects for all tests.28 Year
fixed effects capture annual effects that pertain to all firms, such as changes in gasoline
prices.29 Finally, we include yearly time trends for the industry in which a firm
operates, where we define industries based on the SIC 1 sector classification.30 Industry
trends capture the industry-specific developments over time, e.g., increasing prices of
inputs specific to certain industries.
To reduce the influence of outliers, we winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st
and 99th percentiles.31 We draw our inferences based on standard errors that are two-
way clustered by country (12 clusters) and year (10 clusters), reflecting that all
28 Since we control for firm fixed effects, the binary variable corresponding to the treatment group firms is
absorbed by the fixed effects. This variable is therefore excluded from all tests.
29 Because of the staggered implementation, we are able to estimate a model including year fixed effects as
well as a variable indicating periods after the mandate for GHG emission disclosure (Post).
30 For the installation-level analysis, we use the NACE Rev. 2 industry classification, as SIC codes are not
available at the installation level.
31 We obtain virtually identical results using no outlier treatment.
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Table 1 Definition of variables
Variable Definition Data Source
Dependent variables
ln(Emissions) Natural logarithm of yearly emissions in
metric tons of CO2eq.
EU ETS
ln(Emissions/COGS) Natural logarithm of yearly emissions
scaled by COGS.
EU ETS, Worldscope
ln(Emissions/Sales) Natural logarithm of yearly emissions
scaled by sales.
EU ETS, Worldscope
Gross Margin Sales minus COGS scaled by sales. Worldscope
ln(COGS) Natural logarithm of COGS. Worldscope
ln(Sales) Natural logarithm of sales. Worldscope
Experimental variables
Post Indicator variable, 1: financial years ending
on or after September 30, 2013, 0: otherwise.
BvD Orbis
Treat Indicator variable, 1: UK listed and
incorporated firm affected by the
disclosure mandate, i.e., UK-incorporated
company whose equity capital is either listed
on the Main Market of the London Stock
Exchange, an exchange in a European
Economic Area state, the New York Stock
Exchange or Nasdaq, 0: otherwise.
BvD Orbis
Complexity First principal component of the following
variables measured using values prior
to treatment: (1) number of installations
belonging to a firm, (2) percentage of
foreign emissions of all installations
belonging to a firm, and (3) number of
different sectors of all installations
belonging to a firm.
EU ETS
Control variables
Size Natural logarithm of a firm’s market value in thousand USD. Worldscope
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets. Worldscope
Asset Intensity Property, plant, and equipment divided
by total assets.
Worldscope
Price-to-Book Market value to book value. Worldscope
GDP Natural logarithm of a country’s gross
domestic product in million euro.
Eurostat
Input prices Annual growth rate of the country-level
producer price index.
Eurostat
This table defines all variables used in this study
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installations of a UK-listed and incorporated firm are subject to the mandate, indepen-
dent of the actual geographic location or industry classification of an installation.32
3.2 Empirical test: Hypothesis H2
To estimate the effects of the GHG emission disclosure mandate on carbon intensity,
we run the following regression at the firm level:
CI ¼ β0 þ β1  Post þ β2  Post  Treat þ ∑Control variables
þFixed effects for firmsþ Fixed effects for yearsþ Industry time trendsþ ε ð2Þ
Table 1 again lists the formal definitions of all variables. The dependent variable
measures carbon intensity, which is defined as the natural logarithm of emissions to
the cost of goods sold (COGS). Thus, carbon intensity expresses the tons of CO2
equivalent per euro of goods that the firm sold in a particular year. As before, we
employ a staggered difference-in-differences approach with the same regressors as in
Eq. (1). In a variant of Eq. (2), we use the natural logarithm of emissions to sales as our
alternative carbon intensity measure.33 We estimate our regressions for H2 only at the
firm level because production costs and sales data are not available at the installation
level.
3.3 Empirical test: Hypothesis H3
To test the impact of the disclosure mandate on gross margins, we estimate the
following regression at the firm level:
GM ¼ γ0 þ γ1  Post þ γ2  Post  Treat þ ∑Control variables
þFixed effects for firmsþ Fixed effects for yearsþ Industry time trendsþ ε ð3Þ
Here, GM represents the gross margin, defined as sales minus cost of goods sold, scaled
by sales.34 Again, we employ a staggered difference-in-differences approach. Post and
Treat are defined as before. The variable of interest is Post · Treat. According to H3, we
expect no significant coefficient on Post · Treat. All control variables and fixed effect
variables are as explained above.
3.4 Empirical test: Hypothesis H4
To test how a firm’s complexity influences the impact of the disclosure mandate on
GHG emissions, we estimate the following regression at the firm level:
32 Results are robust using one-way clustering at the country-year level (120 clusters) to account for a potential
influence of a lower number of clusters when using two-way clustering.
33 Our approach here reflects that we only have access to information regarding the composite measure of
sales or cost of goods sold, but not the quantities produced or sold of individual products.
34 We find qualitatively unchanged results for net profits, defined as sales minus cost of goods sold minus
SG&A expense scaled by sales.
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E ¼ δ0 þ δ1  Post þ δ2  Post  Treat þ δ3  Post  Treat  Complexity
þδ4  Post  Complexityþ ∑Control variablesþ Fixed effects for firms
þFixed effects for yearsþ Industry time trendsþ ε
ð4Þ
Here, Complexity is an aggregate score that relies on information regarding the firms’
installations, as recorded in the EU ETS registry data. Specifically, we compute the
complexity score by conducting a principal component analysis using the following
three variables: the firm’s total number of installations, percentage of emissions abroad,
and the number of sectors in which it has active installations. We rely on the first
principal component of the component analysis and measure the score using pre-
treatment period values.35 A higher score indicates that a firm has a more complex
operating structure. To test H4, we interact the DiD coefficient Post · Treat with the
complexity score.
3.5 Data
Table 2 delineates the sample selection process. Our starting sample comprises all EU
ETS installations with emission data for the period 2009–2018 (14,003 installations).
We first assign all installations to their ultimate owner. Figure 1 illustrates the assign-
ment of installations to firms. In a first step, we exclude all installations where data on
the ultimate owner is missing, because in these cases we are not able to assign
installations to the treatment or control group. The link between the installation and
the ultimate corporate owner is established by the Ownership Links and Enhanced
EUTL Dataset Project (OLP).36 The OLP provides the name and Bureau-van-Dijk
identification number (BvD-ID) of an installation’s parent company. Next, we drop
installations owned by firms with missing information on the fiscal year end in the BvD
Orbis database. These steps lead to a sample of 6,327 installations owned by 1,994
unique firms.
Next, we limit our sample to installations owned by firms from EU15 countries. As
we only observe emissions regulated under the EU ETS, we focus on European firms
for all tests. This step results in a sample of 5,196 installations owned by 1,486 unique
firms.
We also limit the sample to listed firms, because disclosure and emission reduction
effects might differ between listed and unlisted firms. By restricting our sample to listed
firms, we ensure the comparability of treatment and control firms.37 This step leads to a
sample of 2,274 installations owned by 197 unique firms.38
35 The eigenvalue of the first principal component is 1.64. Eigenvalues of all remaining principal components
are below 1.
36 Data and a technical note describing the mapping from installations to ultimate owners is available at https://
cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/64596. Note that the mapping in the OLP dataset was conducted in 2013, based on
ownership information for 2005–2007. As it affected UK and non-UK companies, any potential impact its
publication may have had on emissions is captured by year fixed effects.
37 In sensitivity analyses, we perform a matched sample approach to account for differences in emissions
between firms and find virtually unchanged results.
38 We note that the number of listed firms in the EU ETS is rather small compared to the total number of listed
firms in Europe. This is because a relatively small number of manufacturing firms account for a large share of
total emissions (CDP 2017). Thus, a smaller sample size does not impair the external validity of our findings.
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We further exclude firms from countries with other confounding regulations.39
During our sample period, only Ireland implemented an emission-related regulation
(InsideIreland.ie 2009). We also exclude installations for which the ultimate owner
changed during the sample period because, otherwise, the assignment of the treatment
group might be biased. These two restrictions lead to a sample of 2,212 installations
owned by 193 unique firms.
Our sample also excludes installations in the energy supply sector based on the
NACE Rev.2 sector code 35. This exclusion reflects that, for this sector, the UK
government implemented an additional policy to increase the EU ETS allowance price
in 2013 (the so-called “Carbon Price Floor” [CPF]). The CPF applies to electricity
producers (Hirst 2018) and provides an additional emission charge beyond the EU
ETS. Thus, the inclusion of these installations would likely lead to results overstating
the impact of the disclosure mandate.40 This restriction leads to a sample of 1,224
installations owned by 175 unique firms.
Next, we exclude installations in case of maintenance as well as temporary or
permanent shutdowns because these emission reductions are likely unrelated to the
mandate to disclose GHG emissions.41 To identify maintenance, we exclude installa-
tions if their minimum emission level over the sample period is less than 1% of their
maximal emission level. We identify temporary or permanent shutdowns based on
incomplete emission data over time.42 This step leads to a sample of 754 installations
owned by 140 unique firms.
To estimate disclosure effects at the firm level, we next aggregate installation-level
emissions to the firm level. At the firm level, we exclude firm-years with missing data
for estimating our specified regression models. Firm-level accounting data are taken
from Worldscope Datastream. This leads to a sample of 1,268 firm-years from 130
unique firms. Finally, we exclude firms without at least one observation prior to and
after the passage of the Companies Act, to ensure applicability of a difference-in-
differences approach. This step leads to a final firm-level sample of 1,257 firm years
from 127 unique firms. The final installation-level sample consists of 7,267 installation
years from 729 unique installations. In this sample, 24 firms belong to the treatment
group, and 104 firms belong to the control group. An average sample firm operates
5.74 unique installations.
Table 3 presents the sample composition by country. All our treatment group firms
are incorporated in the UK, whereas most of our control group firms are incorporated in
France, Germany, Spain, and Sweden.
39 We focus on potentially confounding regulations on non-financial disclosure because they are the most
likely to bias our results. UK and other major countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain) implemented the EU
Directive 2013/34/EU into national law in 2015. However, this directive most significantly affected small
companies, and the changes primarily related to financial disclosure. An adaptation of the directive to require
non-financial disclosure (EU Directive 2014/95/EU) was only relevant for fiscal years 2017 and later. Our
results are robust to a shorter sample period.
40 We find virtually unchanged results if we keep energy sector installations in the sample.
41 As an example, Lynemouth Power Station reported 2,717,964 tCO2eq in 2014; 1,287,305 tCO2eq in 2015;
and 1,059 tCO2eq in 2016.
42 We find virtually unchanged results if we use a lower threshold (0.5%) or a higher threshold (5%). If we
keep all installations independent of (temporary) shutdowns, we obtain higher point estimates and hence
estimate a lower bound of the treatment effect.
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Given the exclusion of energy sector installations, the firms in our sample
are mostly manufacturing firms: 548 firm-year observations belong to the SIC
industry 2 (i.e. SIC 2000–2999), and 366 belong to the SIC industry 3 (i.e. SIC
3000–3999).
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics (Panel A) and correlations (Panel B) for
our final sample. The average treatment (control) group firm in our sample
produces yearly emissions of 807,641 (1,280,441) tCO2eq. We observe that
treated firms emit less GHG, on average, and have a lower carbon intensity, a
higher COGS, higher sales, and a higher gross margin than control firms. Due
to a skewed distribution, we use log-transformed emissions, carbon intensity,
COGS, and sales in our regression analyses. We also find that firms in the
treatment group are larger and more highly leveraged and have higher asset
intensity and price to book ratio compared to control group firms. With regard
to the Pearson and Spearman correlations, we do not observe high correlations
between the continuous control variables.
Table 2 Sample selection









All installations listed in the EU ETS with non-missing emission
data. Sample period 2009–2018
109,029 14,003
Installation-level exclusion of
installations without known ultimate owner or date of fiscal
year end
50,268 6,327 1,994
installations owned by non-EU firms 41,419 5,196 1,486
installations owned by unlisted firms 18,861 2,274 197
installations affected by confounding regulations or
ownership changes
18,409 2,212 193
energy sector installations 10,018 1,224 175
virtually closed installations (i.e., maintenance and
temporary or permanent shutdown)
7,540 754 1,399 140
Firm-level exclusion of
missing firm-level variables for estimating Eqs. (1)–(4) 7,293 735 1,268 130
firms without at least one observation prior to and after the
implementation of the Companies Act
7,267 729 1,257 127
Final sample for firm-level regression analyses 1,257 127
Final sample for installation-level regression analyses 7,267 729
This table delineates the sample selection for estimating the influence of the disclosure mandate on firms’
GHG emission levels and operating performance
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4 Results
4.1 Impact of the 2013 act on GHG emissions and carbon intensity
Table 5 reports our findings regarding the impact of the GHG disclosure mandate on
subsequent GHG emissions. We also test the impact of the mandate on carbon intensity
using two alternative definitions: the ratio of emissions to COGS, and the ratio of
emissions to sales. By taking logarithms, we can interpret a transformed value of the
corresponding coefficients as additive percentage changes.
Columns (I) and (II) in Table 5 present results of our estimations using installation-
level emission data. While our main interest is at the firm level, the installation-level
estimates establish a baseline result that allows us to assess possible effects of aggre-
gating installation-level data to the firm level. Columns (I) and (II) present the findings
without and with firm-level control variables, respectively. In all specifications, we use
installation and year fixed effects and industry time trends.
In column (I) of Table 5 the coefficient on the variable of interest Post · Treatment is
significantly negative (p: <0.05). This result is also sizable in economic terms, as
affected firms on average decreased their GHG emissions by about 8%, compared to
companies not affected by the act. The 8% estimate reflects that 1 - exp(−0.082) =
0.078. Controlling for differences in firm characteristics (column (II)) leads to a
virtually unchanged estimate of −0.082. We note that the high adjusted R2 is due to
the stringent fixed effects specification, which absorbs installation-specific and year-
specific unobservable heterogeneity as well as industry trends. The installation-level
results provide evidence for H1 that emissions of the treated firms decreased compared
to installations owned by firms in the control group.
Table 3 Sample composition
Control group Treatment group Total
Austria 40 0 40
Belgium 60 0 60
Germany 216 0 216
Denmark 30 0 30
Spain 147 0 147
Finland 80 0 80
France 238 0 238
United Kingdom 0 237 237
Luxembourg 10 0 10
The Netherlands 50 0 50
Portugal 39 0 39
Sweden 110 0 110
Total 1,020 237 1,257
This table presents the geographic distribution of sample firms. Treatment group firms are listed and
incorporated in the United Kingdom. Control group firms are listed and incorporated in other EU15 states
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Columns (III) and (IV) in Table 5 present results analogous to those in columns (I)
and (II), but at the firm level. These and all remaining firm-level regressions control for
unobserved heterogeneity by including year and owner-specific fixed effects. We also
account for industry-level trends at the one-digit SIC level. Column (III) reports
estimates without further firm- or country-level controls. We again find a negative
and significant coefficient estimate on Post · Treat (p: <0.01), indicating a reduction in
GHG emissions for treated firms by about 9%. This reduction is comparable to the
emission reduction of about 8% measured using installation-level emission data (col-
umn (I)), suggesting that the reduction in emissions occurs fairly evenly across
installations owned by each firm. In the richer specification including further covariates
(column IV), we control for the same firm-level covariates as in column (II) as well as
for country-level control variables. Column (IV) corroborates the magnitude of the
emission reduction obtained in the simpler model. It reports a similar estimated effect,
about 8% (p: <0.05), when controlling for the firm-level variables: size, the ratio of
fixed assets to total assets, leverage, and price-to-book value (PTB). The additional
controls ln(GDP) and input prices account for potential differences in aggregate
demand and cost developments, respectively. The analysis of firm-level emissions thus
also supports hypothesis H1.
In the final set of regressions shown in Table 5, we estimate the effect of the act on
firm-level carbon intensity. This dependent variable, defined as either emissions divid-
ed by COGS or emissions divided by sales, ensures that any observed emission
reductions are not merely a consequence of reductions in production volume. Columns
(V) and (VI) report the estimates when including all covariates. The findings are similar
to those for ln(emissions), with estimated reductions in carbon intensity of about 13%
(p: <0.05) when using COGS as the denominator and of about 10% (p: <0.05) when
using sales as a denominator. These results indicate that the emission reductions were
not mainly driven by a decline in output or capacity utilization.43
The main assumption underlying the difference-in-differences approach is a com-
mon trend between treatment and control group firms (Roberts and Whited 2013). To
examine whether a common pre-treatment trend exists for emissions and carbon
intensities, we follow common approaches in the existing literature (Bertrand and
Mullainathan 2003; Serfling 2016). Specifically, we replace the interaction terms Post
· Treatment with separate interaction terms for each period relative to the implemen-
tation of the GHG mandate in 2013. We adjust time periods to reflect the staggered
nature of the treatment. When estimating the model, insignificant pre-treatment coef-
ficients close to zero indicate the validity of a common pre-treatment trend.
In our tests of parallel trends we focus on firm-level emissions and emission-
intensity.44 Fig. 2 shows the results for firm-level emissions. Values on the y-axis
show point estimates and 90% confidence intervals. Values on the x-axis refer to the
number of years removed from the start of the post-treatment period. The benchmark
period is t = −1, i.e., the last pre-treatment year. Due to the staggered nature of the
treatment, t = −1 is 2012 for many installations, and 2013 for others. Each point
estimate shown in Fig. 2 therefore captures the difference in the emission levels
43 Our results on the emission reductions (H1) are robust to controlling for COGS and sales in columns (III)
and (IV) in Table 5, instead of using these variables as denominators of emissions, as in columns (V) and (VI).
44 We observe parallel trends during the pre-treatment period also for installation-level emissions.
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between the treatment and control groups relative to t = −1. The pre-treatment period
consists of the periods t < = −4 to t = −1, while periods t = 0 to t > = 4 constitute the
post-treatment period. We aggregate the coefficients for the first and last periods
depicted, also due to the staggered treatment. Accordingly, the t < = −4 value represents
the average of the coefficient estimates for the interactions between each Treat variable
and year dummies for periods four or more years prior to treatment. Analogously, the
t > = 4 value is the average of the estimates for the interactions between Treat and year
dummies for periods four or more years after treatment.
Regarding firm-level emissions, Fig. 2 indicates a difference in pre-treatment
and post-treatment coefficients. While treated firms have somewhat higher pre-
treatment emissions than the control group four years prior to the mandate, this
difference is fairly stable and close to zero during the three-year pre-treatment
period. Point estimates are not significantly different from zero in any year
from t > −4 to t = −1.45 Based on these results, we do not find any violation of
the common trends assumption for firm-level emissions. The estimates for the
period t = 0 to t > = 4 show the evolution of the treatment effect over time. We
observe that emissions in the treatment group decrease immediately after the
start of the post-treatment period. The treated firms decrease their emissions and
maintain their reductions for the first two years until t = 1. Thereafter, emission
levels converge again between the two groups.
A comparison with the findings in Grewal (2021) may be instructive. First, while
Grewal’s (2021) emission measure consists of total Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions, we
focus solely on Scope 1 emissions. Second, while our estimated average emission
reduction is consistent with the main finding in Grewal (2021), the results from our
event study design suggest that the effect on emissions is transitory. The findings in the
two studies are therefore complementary, as both the samples and the emission
outcome variables differ.
Figure 3 shows the results for carbon intensity. A similar picture emerges as
in Fig. 2, irrespective of whether we define carbon intensity as emissions
divided by COGS (Fig. 3, Panel a) or as emissions divided by sales (Fig. 3,
Panel b). Point estimates are not significantly different from zero in any year
from t > −4 to t = −1, thus supporting the common trend assumption. Again, we
observe a clear treatment effect, which manifests itself at the beginning of the
post-treatment period. As with emissions, coefficients immediately after the start
of the post-treatment period are negative and marginally significant, while point
estimates converge to zero in later years.
45 As shown in Figs. 2 and 3, we cannot rule out a violation of the parallel trend assumption further than four
years ahead of the mandate. Using a shorter pre-treatment period beginning at t = −3 instead yields more stable
trends but lower treatment effects, i.e., ranging between −0.108 and − 0.054. Yet, these lower estimates are
attributable to our strict and conservative sample composition. This composition already provides a lower
bound of the effect, because we exclude installations that are subject to temporary or permanent shutdowns. If
we instead attribute temporary shutdowns to the disclosure mandate, i.e., opt for a less strict approach, we find
more pronounced negative effects even for the shortened-time series (point estimates ranging between −0.186
and − 0.158), as well as for the full sample (point estimates ranging between −0.212 and − 0.185). If we
attribute temporary as well as permanent shutdowns to the disclosure mandate, i.e., opt for the least strict
approach, we find negative effects for the shortened-time series (point estimates ranging between −0.274
and − 0.247) as well as for the full time-series (point estimates ranging between −0.302 and − 0.275).
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4.2 Effects on financial operating performance
Our next set of tests addresses the effects of the mandate on the financial operating
performance. Table 6 present the results. In column (I), we show the results without
including further control variables. We find a significantly negative treatment effect on
the firms’ gross margins. Column (II) of Table 6 shows the results when controlling for
firm size, asset intensity, leverage, and PTB, as well as for a country’s GDP and
changes in input prices—the point estimate becomes statistically insignificant. This
result shows that the gross margins of disclosing firms following the 2013 mandate are
not statistically different from the margins of our control group of non-disclosing firms,
providing support for hypothesis H3.
To further explore our findings on H3, we investigate the individual components of
the gross margin, i.e., production costs and sales. The unaffected gross margins we
documented before do not rule out any increases in production costs. Stable gross
margins could likewise be consistent with a simultaneous increase in both costs and
sales.
We first estimate the treatment effect of the UK mandate on changes in production
costs and rerun our DiD estimation using the logarithm of costs of goods sold as the
dependent variable. Column (III) in Table 6 presents the results without further control
variables. The findings suggest that firms subject to the mandate incur, on average, a
Fig. 2 Emission levels around the disclosure mandate. This figure shows the change in verified GHG
emissions surrounding the disclosure mandate. Values on the y-axis show differences in the natural logarithm
of emissions of treated and control group firms and 90% confidence intervals. To obtain these estimates, we
replicate model (1) but replace Post · Treat with separate interaction terms for each individual period
surrounding the mandate. To account for the staggered implementation of the disclosure mandate, we adjust
time periods using relative time periods. Values on the x-axis indicate periods relative to the first-time
application of the mandate (t = 0). For firms with fiscal year end after September 30, 2013, t = 0 refers to
the year 2013. For firms with fiscal year end before September 30, 2013, t = 0 refers to the year 2014. Periods
t = −2, t = −3, and t < = −4 are prior to the first-time application of the disclosure mandate. Periods t = 0, t = +1,
and t > = 2 are on or after the first-time application of the disclosure mandate. We use the last year prior to the
first-time application (t = −1) as the benchmark period
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Fig. 3 Carbon intensity around the disclosure mandate. Panel A: ln(Emissions/COGS). Panel B:
ln(Emissions/Sales). This figure shows the change in carbon intensity surrounding the disclosure mandate.
Panel A shows carbon intensity defined as ln(Emissions/COGS). Panel B shows carbon intensity defined as
ln(Emissions/Sales). Values on the y-axis show differences in carbon intensity reductions of treated and
control group firms and 90% confidence intervals. To obtain these estimates, we replicate model (2) but
replace Post · Treat with separate interaction terms for each individual year surrounding the mandate. To
account for the staggered implementation of the disclosure mandate, we adjust time periods using relative time
periods. Values on the x-axis indicate periods relative to the first-time application of the disclosure mandate
(t = 0). For firms with fiscal year end after September 30, 2013, t = 0 refers to the year 2013. For firms with
fiscal year end before September 30, 2013, t = 0 refers to the year 2014. Periods t = −2, t = −3, and t < = −4 are
prior to the first-time application of the disclosure mandate. Periods t = 0, t = +1, and t > = 2 are on or after the
first-time application of the disclosure mandate. We use the last year prior to the first-time application (t = −1)
as the benchmark period
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statistically significant increase in production costs of about 10% (p: <0.1). Based on
this simple specification, the estimates suggest that emission reductions have been
costly to firms. However, after adding the same control variables used in the other tests,
the point estimate is reduced in magnitude and becomes statistically insignificant, as
shown in column (IV) of Table 6. Thus, when taking account of the different firm and
country characteristics, our results imply that firms were indeed able to find low-cost
options when reducing their GHG emissions. In untabulated regressions, we confirm
this result in a corresponding test when using capital expenditures (CAPEX) as the
dependent variable instead of costs of goods sold. Hence, the observed emission
reductions cannot be related to an increase in capital expenditures for, e.g., more
energy-efficient machinery and appliances, either.
Table 6 The effect of a GHG disclosure mandate on financial operating performance
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Dependent variable: Gross margin Gross margin ln(COGS) ln(COGS) ln(Sales) ln(Sales)
Experimental variables
Post Treatment −0.030*** −0.015 0.107* 0.067 0.046 0.025
(−3.623) (−1.032) (2.255) (1.531) (1.075) (0.580)
Post 0.024*** 0.018** −0.086** −0.007 −0.040 0.034
(3.468) (2.388) (−2.516) (−0.257) (−1.647) (1.335)
Control variables
Size 0.022*** 0.200*** 0.248***
(3.349) (3.923) (4.998)
Asset intensity 0.008 −0.164 −0.141
(0.150) (−0.455) (−0.441)
Leverage −0.071 0.846*** 0.677***
(−1.202) (4.787) (4.996)
Price-to-Book −0.001 −0.044*** −0.047***
(−0.629) (−3.311) (−3.372)
GDP −0.150* 0.409* 0.253
(−1.932) (2.151) (1.734)
Input prices −0.091 0.157 0.088
(−1.174) (0.358) (0.214)
Industry trends yes yes yes yes yes yes
Installation/firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,257 1,257 1,257 1,257 1,257 1,257
Adjusted R2 0.902 0.905 0.986 0.988 0.988 0.990
This table presents the results of estimating the effect of a GHG disclosure mandate on financial operating
performance (Eq. (3)). The dependent variable in columns (I) and (II) is the yearly gross margin. The
dependent variable in columns (III) and (IV) is the natural logarithm of yearly COGS. The dependent variable
in columns (V) and (VI) is the natural logarithm of yearly sales. Reported values are coefficients and t-statistics
in parentheses. Variables are defined in Table 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. Standard errors are
clustered by country and year
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We also run our estimation using the logarithm of sales as the dependent variable.
With stable gross margins and statistically unchanged production costs, we expect to
see no changes in sales. Columns (V) and (VI) of Table 6 show the results. The
findings without and with covariates validate this conjecture.
Finally, we examine the parallel pre-treatment trends in both COGS and sales for
UK and EU firms. For instance, we could fail to identify cost effects for the UK-
disclosing firms, if EU firms in our control group experienced an upward trend in costs
for other reasons. In Fig. 4, we plot the common trend graphs for COGS and sales. As
before, we compute the differences for UK and EU firms for each year by replacing the
interaction term Post · Treatment with separate interaction terms for each period
relative to the year of the implementation of the disclosure mandate. The differences
in COGS between UK and EU firms are statistically not different from zero during the
pre-treatment years. For sales, we observe largely insignificant pre-treatment differ-
ences between UK and EU firms. During the post-treatment period, the point estimates
are greater than zero, yet insignificant for most periods.
Taken together, the results in this section show that disclosing firms do not expe-
rience significant cost or sales increases, on average, and consequently no significant
effect on gross margins. As such, our findings provide no support for the concern that
GHG disclosure mandates could have a deteriorating effect on financial operating
performance.
Finally, we exploit information about the complexity of a firm’s installation portfo-
lio by interacting the treatment variable with a complexity measure. Column (I) in
Table 7 shows that firms with a more complex installation structure, i.e., with higher
complexity scores, reduce their emissions by less than less complex firms. Columns (II)
and (III) of Table 7 show that this finding is robust to using the two alternative
definitions for carbon intensity. Columns (IV)–(VI) indicate that our results on oper-
ating performance are largely unaffected by including the information on firm com-
plexity. This finding is intuitive, as firms with more complex operating structures
reduce emissions to a lesser extent. We also do not expect to see any changes in gross
margins, costs, or sales. In conclusion, firms with a more complex corporate structure
are less successful at reducing both emissions and carbon intensity, thus providing
supporting evidence for H4.
5 Sensitivity and additional analyses
In this section, we report the findings from sensitivity tests and additional analyses. For
our first sensitivity test, we construct a matched sample of treatment and control firms.
Accordingly, we match each treatment firm with a control group firm within the same
SIC-1 industry based on average pre-treatment emission levels, i.e., a one-to-one
matching without replacement.46 We use the same dependent variables as in our main
tests. Table 8 presents the results and shows that our estimates are qualitatively similar
to the ones obtained before. Furthermore, we use an industry-balanced sample, i.e.,
only firms from industries with treatment and control group observations. This ap-
proach leads to unchanged results.
46 We find similar results if we match on average pre-treatment firm size (i.e., market value of equity).
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Fig. 4 Change in operating performance surrounding the disclosure mandate. Panel A: ln(COGS). Panel B:
ln(Sales). This figure shows the change in a firm’s financial operating performance surrounding the disclosure
mandate. Values on the y-axis show differences in the natural logarithm of emissions of treated and control
group firms and 90% confidence intervals. To obtain these estimates, we replicate model (3) but replace Post ·
Treat with separate interaction terms for each individual period surrounding the disclosure mandate. To
account for the staggered implementation of the act, we adjust time periods using relative time periods. Values
on the x-axis indicate periods relative to the first-time application of the disclosure mandate (t = 0). For firms
with fiscal year end after September 30, 2013, t = 0 refers to the year 2013. For firms with fiscal year end
before September 30, 2013, t = 0 refers to the year 2014. Periods t = −2, t = −3, and t < = −4 are prior to the
first-time application of the disclosure mandate. Periods t = 0, t = +1, and t > = 2 are on or after the first-time
application of the disclosure mandate. We use the last year prior to the first-time application (t = −1) as the
benchmark period.
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We acknowledge that during our sample period France mandated broad corporate
disclosures regarding environmental stewardship. While we kept French installations
for our main tests, we find virtually unchanged results for emission reductions and
operating performance if we exclude installations owned by French firms. Our results
on emission reductions and operating performance are also robust to not excluding
energy sector installations or only excluding electricity installations from our sample.
As discussed in our data section, electricity installations have been subject to additional
climate regulations during our observation period.
We also validate the robustness of our findings to the sample period and emission data
availability: (1) we exclude the entry-into-force year of the Companies Act, (2) we do not
exclude installations without emissions in a single year or maintenance during the sample
period, and (3) we use a balanced sample at the firm level, i.e., we only use firms with data
for all sample periods. All three approaches lead to unchanged emission results.
In concluding this section, we note that, with regard to other potentially confounding
regulations within the European Union, we are unable to document either a concurring
regulation or another event that would explain our results. Of course, we cannot rule
out that an unspecified event, which coincided with the 2013 act and differentially
affected listed firms in the UK, had a confounding effect on our findings. Finally, we
only investigate the effects of one GHG emission disclosure regulation on specific
firms (covered by the EU ETS) in one country (UK) for a specific period (2009–2018).
6 Concluding remarks
This study contributes to the growing literature on the effects of disclosure require-
ments for firms’ activities in the ESG domain. While there appears to be considerable
interest in having standardized reports on such activities, there does not seem to be a
generally accepted measurement and verification framework for many ESG variables.
Environmental pollution is an exception in this regard, because for many pollutants
firms already have to demonstrate compliance with existing regulations. Our study on
the effect of the 2013 mandate that required UK firms to disclose their greenhouse gas
emissions in annual reports exploits the fact that most European manufacturing sites
already had to have their reported emissions verified under the rules of the European
Emission Trading scheme.
The introduction of the Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’
Report) Regulations 2013 provides a source of exogenous variation in the disclosure
regime of firms located in different countries. We find that installations belonging to
UK companies subject to the disclosure mandate exhibit significant reductions in GHG
emissions compared to installations in the control group, after including various time-
variant and time-invariant fixed effects as well as firm specific control variables.
Specifically, the treated firms reduced emissions by about 8% following the disclosure
mandate, relative to pre-treatment emission levels. These results obtain at both the
installation level and the firm level. We observe comparable incremental reductions in
the carbon intensity of the treated firms when total emissions are scaled either by sales
or cost of goods sold. Additional cross-sectional tests indicate that multinational firms
with more complex operations tend to reduce their emissions by a smaller percentage
than their less complex counterparts.
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With regard to financial consequences, we find that in the years following the mandate
the treated firms experienced a small, but statistically insignificant, increase in both their
production costs and their sales. The latter effect is consistent with the interpretation of firms
having improved their public imagewith customers on account of having improved a central
CSR variable. Since the small and statistically insignificant increases in both revenues and
Table 7 The effect of installation portfolio complexity on emission and financial operating performance
Emissions Operating financial performance
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)








Post · Treat −0.076** −0.128** −0.093** −0.015 0.067 0.025
(−3.101) (−3.181) (−2.358) (−1.008) (1.537) (0.588)
Post · Treat ·
Complexity
0.056*** 0.085** 0.085** 0.000 −0.001 −0.003
(3.466) (3.000) (2.960) (0.111) (−0.019) (−0.087)
Post 0.116** 0.125** 0.085* 0.017* −0.005 0.032
(2.829) (2.609) (1.943) (2.081) (−0.202) (1.271)
Post · Complexity −0.003 −0.010 0.003 −0.008 0.007 −0.005
(−0.218) (−0.474) (0.144) (−1.413) (0.460) (−0.462)
Control variables
Size −0.007 −0.227*** −0.273*** 0.021*** 0.201*** 0.247***
(−0.281) (−4.420) (−5.355) (3.267) (3.983) (4.995)
Asset intensity 0.381 0.473 0.491 0.014 −0.170 −0.137
(1.416) (0.956) (1.082) (0.256) (−0.468) (−0.427)
Leverage −0.133 −1.017*** −0.839** −0.069 0.844*** 0.678***
(−0.376) (−3.378) (−2.555) (−1.188) (4.766) (5.060)
Price-to-Book −0.005 0.041*** 0.043*** −0.001 −0.044*** −0.047***
(−0.794) (4.452) (4.270) (−0.813) (−3.300) (−3.387)
GDP −0.221* −0.627** −0.419* −0.154** 0.414* 0.250
(−1.861) (−2.854) (−2.034) (−2.309) (2.206) (1.747)
Input prices −0.239 −0.389 −0.297 −0.096 0.162 0.083
(−0.654) (−0.579) (−0.528) (−1.210) (0.365) (0.204)
Industry trends yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,257 1,257 1,257 1,257 1,257 1,257
Adjusted R2 0.987 0.982 0.983 0.905 0.988 0.990
This table presents the results of estimating the effect of a GHG disclosure mandate on GHG emissions and
financial operating performance depending on a firm’s installation portfolio complexity (model (4)). The
dependent variables in columns (I)–(III) indicate a firm’s emissions and carbon intensity. The dependent
variables in columns (IV)–(VI) indicate financial operating performance. Reported values are coefficients and
t-statistics in parentheses. Variables are defined in Table 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. Standard
errors are clustered by country and year
The impact of carbon disclosure mandates on emissions and financial...
costs net out to a zero effect in the gross margins, our results indicate that the disclosure
mandate did not have a deteriorating effect on the financial operating performance of the
firms subject to the act.
The emissions data for the firms in our treatment group had already been publicly
available prior to the UK mandate, albeit in a distributed form, so outside observers had
to incur search costs in order to assign installation-level emissions to publicly listed
firms. Our empirical findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the disclosure
requirement made firm-specific carbon footprint information directly accessible to
stakeholders and thus resulted in additional transparency, which motivated the firms’
management to achieve greater emission reductions.
Table 8 Results for matched sample
Emissions Operating financial performance











Post · Treat −0.105*** −0.167* −0.133** −0.020 0.070 0.024
(−4.228) (−2.024) (−2.733) (0.473) (0.396) (0.611)
Post 0.212*** 0.252*** 0.187*** 0.033 −0.055 0.017
(4.372) (4.749) (4.276) (0.123) (0.219) (0.623)
Control variables
Size 0.029** −0.158*** −0.228*** 0.035** 0.139** 0.212***
(2.655) (−3.417) (−5.933) (0.040) (0.017) (0.001)
Asset intensity 0.449 0.701 0.898* −0.073 −0.337 −0.425
(1.387) (1.338) (2.291) (0.402) (0.309) (0.126)
Leverage 0.287 −0.933* −0.740 −0.048 1.104*** 0.940***
(0.593) (−1.994) (−1.733) (0.462) (0.002) (0.001)
Price-to-Book 0.001 0.046** 0.047** −0.001 −0.041*** −0.044***
(0.055) (2.350) (2.424) (0.314) (0.010) (0.004)
GDP −0.064 −1.024* −0.622 −0.175 0.992** 0.710*
(−0.309) (−1.947) (−1.174) (0.254) (0.032) (0.098)
Input prices 0.069 0.110 0.297 −0.100 −0.100 −0.221
(0.098) (0.107) (0.278) (0.540) (0.890) (0.752)
Industry trends yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 472 472 472 472 472 472
Adjusted R2 0.982 0.981 0.983 0.937 0.990 0.992
This table presents the results of estimating the effect of a GHG disclosure mandate on GHG emissions and
operating performance. We use a one-to-one matching without replacement on pre-treatment emissions for
firms within the same SIC-1 industry. Reported values are coefficients and p-values in parentheses. Variables
are defined in Table 1. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by country and year
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In the current debate about alternative policy tools for addressing the impending
climate crisis, economists generally point to pricing carbon emissions or subsidizing
low-carbon energy alternatives. The findings in this paper indicate that the increased
transparency associated with greenhouse gas reporting mandates, like the 2013 act in
the UK, could be another policy lever for reducing corporate carbon emissions.
Appendix A: Reporting items for the Strategic Report according
to The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report)
Regulations 2013
Disclosure requirement Section of the Act
Annual quantity of emissions in tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent from activities for
which that company is responsible including the combustion of fuel; and the
operation of any facility (listed firms)
P. 7, 15. (2)
Annual quantity of emissions in tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent resulting from the
purchase of electricity, heat, steam or cooling by the company for its own use (listed firms)
P. 7, 15. (3)
Methodologies used to calculate the information on carbon dioxide equivalents (listed firms) P. 7, 16.
At least one ratio which expresses the quoted company’s annual emissions in relation to
a quantifiable factor associated with the company’s activities (listed firms)
P. 17, 17.
Not only the information required by paragraphs 15(2) and (3) and 17, but also that
information as disclosed in the report for the preceding financial year.
P. 17, 18.
Description of the company’s strategy (listed firms) Ch. 4A, 414C (8) (a)
Description of the company’s business model (listed firms) Ch. 4A, 414C (8) (b)
A breakdown showing at the end of the financial year the number of persons of each
sex who were directors of the company (listed firms)
Ch. 4A, 414C (8) (c)
(i)
A breakdown showing at the end of the financial year the number of persons of each
sex who were senior managers of the company (listed firms)
Ch. 4A, 414C (8) (c)
(ii)
A breakdown showing at the end of the financial year the number of persons of each
sex who were employees of the company (listed firms)
Ch. 4A, 414C (8) (c)
(iii)
Fair review of the company’s business Ch. 4A, 414C (2) (a)
Description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing the company Ch. 4A, 414C (2) (b)
Balanced and comprehensive analysis of the development and performance of the
business
Ch 4A, 414C (3) (a)
Balanced and comprehensive analysis of the position of the company’s business at the
end of the year
Ch. 4A, 414C (3) (b)
Analysis using financial key performance indicators Ch. 4A, 414C (4) (a)
Where appropriate: analysis using other key performance indicators, including
information relating to environmental matters and employee matters
Ch. 4A, 414C (4) (b)
To the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or
position of the company’s business: main trends and factors likely to affect the future
development, performance and position (listed firms)
Ch. 4A, 414C (7) (a)
To the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or
position of the company’s business: information about environmental matters
(including the impact of the company’s business on the environment) including
information about any policies of the company in relation to those matters and the
effectiveness of those policies (listed firms)
Ch. 4A, 414C (7)
(b) (i)
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This table provides a detailed overview of all new disclosure requirements of The
Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013. The
first column shows the newly required disclosure in the strategic report. The second
column shows the section of the act.
Appendix B: Major changes in the EU ETS regulation surrounding
the introduction of the third trading period in 2013
Two key changes to the design of the EU ETS took place in the third trading period.
First, an EU-wide cap was introduced, stipulating a decrease by 1.74% each year
relative to a pre-specified baseline emission level. Second, whereas until 2012 almost
all allowances were allocated free of charge, a greater share of allowances was
auctioned starting in 2013. These changes could potentially call into question the
causal effect of the act, if the changes in the ETS system differentially affected UK
firms compared to firms in the control group.
With respect to the introduction of the EU-wide cap, this change was intended to
decrease the political cost of decentralized cap-setting coordinated by the European
Commission (see, e.g., Ellerman et al. 2016). Since allowances could be traded across
the EU without any restrictions, as they could prior to 2013, there is no reason to
believe that UK firms had either advantages or disadvantages with respect to their
regulatory burden due to the change in cap setting, compared to firms in other EU
countries.
Regarding the shift toward a greater share of allowances being auctioned, we note
that the electricity sector was primarily affected by this development, with power
generators in the majority of European countries losing the vast majority of their free
allocation in 2013. However, as we exclude the power sector from the empirical
analysis in this paper due to the potential bias stemming from the introduction of the
UK Carbon Price Floor in 2013 (as explained in Section 3.5), the rise of allowance
auctioning for power generators is not a concern for our analysis.
In the industrial sectors, which are the focus of this paper, free allocation continued
to be the dominant form of distributing the aggregate emissions cap. About 97%–98%
of industrial emissions were represented by sectors that were deemed to be at risk of
carbon leakage during the period after 2013. The firms in this sector therefore received
their full allotment of free allowances (ECA 2020). As the vast majority of the
industrial sector’s emissions continued to be covered by free allowances, there is no
(continued)
To the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or
position of the company’s business: information about the company’s employees
including information about any policies of the company in relation to those matters
and the effectiveness of those policies (listed firms)
Ch. 4A, 414C (7)
(b) (ii)
To the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or
position of the company’s business: information about social, community and human
rights issues including information about any policies of the company in relation to
those matters and the effectiveness of those policies (listed firms)
Ch. 4A, 414C (7)
(b) (iii)
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indication that UK firms were subject to advantages or disadvantages in comparison to
firms from other EU countries.
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